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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

PlaintifiDAppellee,

:

Case No. 980112-CA

:

Brief of Appellee

:

Priority Number 2

vs.
ROBYN R. PEARSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State agrees with Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
L

Issues Presented
A. Was the defendant/appellant, Pearson properly convicted of a violation of Utah

Code Annotated Section 17-16a-5, Receiving Compensation for Assisting in a
Transaction involving his employer Millard County, where he was and had been
employed by Millard County as the County Administrator for many years, and where he
entered into a private contract with Stansbury Design Associates, a company belonging to
Joe Urbanik, to do part of the work which Urbanik had contracted to do for Millard
County, Pearson's employer, and did not file the sworn statement and make the
1

disclosure at a public meeting concerning that private contract according to the mandate
of the said Section?1
B. Was the Jury properly instructed concerning the mens rea of entering into the
private contract with Urbanik and failing to file the sworn statement pursuant to the
Section where the Jury was instructed that they needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Pearson had to have acted knowingly and intentionally in the matter, but did not
advise them that he had to act with scienter intentions?
C. Was the defendant/appellant, Pearson properly convicted of theft of services
where he used County resources to perform his private contractual obligations?
H.

Standards of Review
The State agrees with Appellant Pearson's recited Standards of Review.2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the case.
The State agrees with Appellant Pearson's recited Nature of the Case.

BL.

Course of Proceedings.
The State agrees with Appellant Pearson's recited Course of Proceedings.

III.

Statement of Facts

'Pearson has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the Jury verdict of guilty
on this count.
2

Except the Defendant Pearson has failed to marshall the evidence against him
from the record.
2

Appellant Pearson has mistated the facts, and has failed to marshall the evidence
that supports the Jury verdict of guilty on Count I and II. Therefore Appellee restates the
facts.
The defendant/appellant Robyn Pearson had been employed by Millard County,
State of Utah, as the "Millard County Administrator" for many years. Generally he
was hired to assist the Millard County Commission in the daily operation and
administration of the ongoing county affairs. The commissioners were elected officials
who spent part time running the affairs of the County. Pearson was needed because of
his expertise in public administration to assist in the daily operations. [R. 6173
page 7 and R. 618 page 218 line 16-25 and page 219.] In regards to this case he
specifically was assigned the work of overseeing the operation of the county's garbage
collection and disposal program that the county had started voluntarily in about 1986.
Pearson had assisted in developing that program and had run the program since its
inception. [R. 617 page 12-14,25; State's Ex. 47 & 48]
About 1990 the Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 255, which envisioned the
creation of a state wide solid waste management system or plan. [State's Ex. 1] Joe
Urbanik was chairman of the State of Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Committee.
[State's Ex 5 & 6; R. 618 page 54] Pearson, as County Administrator, worked with the

3,f

R. 617 and 618" refer to volumes I and II of the transcript of the trial. 617 refers to
volume I and 618 refers to volume II of the transcript according to the page numbering system
used by the clerk of the court.
3

state people on developing the involvement of counties in the solid waste planning
process as early as September 1990. [R. 618 page 60-61; State's Ex. 7] Each county in
the state was to prepare a 20-year plan for itself, and submit it to the state which in turn
would create the state wide plan based on the counties' plans. Senate Bill 255 was
funded with $400,000.00 dollars, to be divided up between the counties of the state to
help pay for the cost of devising the county plans. Millard County's portion of the money
was about $12,000.00. [State's Ex. 14]
The State wrote mandatory rules and guidelines for the counties to follow in
devising the county plans. [State's Ex. 2 & 3] The State entered into an agreement with
Millard County to give it the $12,000.00 and the county was to, in return, submit a 20year plan consistent with the rules and guidelines.This agreement was signed November
19, 1991 which is an important date in this case.[ State's Ex. 16, Addendum A; State's
Ex. 41] Pearson called Urbanik on the same day, as he was advised that Urbanik was
going to privately solicit contracts to prepare the plans for counties in the State, and
talked to him about doing the work of preparing the plan for Millard County. [R. 618
page 132 line 6-10]
Millard County did thereafter enter into a contract with Stansbury Design
Associates, a business entity of Joe Urbanik, to pay him $11,983.00 to:
"Provide solid waste management planning services to
comply with the requirements of S.B. 255, (Utah Solid Waste
Management Act) The scope of services is based upon the
Guidelines for County Solid Waste Management Plans and
rules adopted by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Wast Board
4

for such plans." [State's Ex. 18, Addendum B]
This contract between Millard County and Urbanik was completely orchestrated
by Pearson as the Millard County Administrator. [ R. 618 page 226] Urbanik met with the
Millard County Commissioners in public meeting on June 22, 1992 and, with Pearson,
told them about Senate Bill 255. [State's Ex. 42] Millard County's obligation under the
contract with Urbanik was to pay the money to him and to appoint a Representative to act
on behalf of the County. That appointee was Pearson. [State's Ex. 18, Addendum B].
The agreement was signed by Urbanik on June 23, 1992, the day after the commission
meeting. On the same day, Urbanik wrote a letter to Robyn Pearson and advised him that
he was hired privately to do part of the work on the waste management plan contract and
that the money paid by Millard County would be split even with Pearson. [See State's Ex.
26, Addendum C] This letter also billed Millard County for one-fourth of the contract
price backdated to November 19, 1991 when Pearson first called Urbanik about the work.
Millard County signed the agreement with Urbanik on July 6, 1992. [State's Ex. 18 and
45]
Pearson never filed the required sworn statement and never made the required
disclosure in public meeting even though he regularly attended county commission
meetings throughout all relevant times as part of his duties as Millard County
Administrator.[R. 617 page 11; State's Ex. 41, 42 and 45]
The work was in fact split between Urbanik and Pearson. [State's Ex. 4]. Urbanik
used Ex. 4 to divide the work between him as "SDA" and Pearson as "RP."[R. 618 page

5

138] It was a copy of the Plan Review Checklist out of the Draft Guidelines, State's Ex.
2. Urbanik did in fact pay Pearson half of the money he got for the work from Millard
County. [R. 618 page 168 line 25]

Even though the contract was a private one between him and Urbanik, Pearson
continued to work as the Millard County Administrator, and while so employed he used
the resources of the county under his control as Administrator to assemble, transcribe and
fax information to Urbanik which was his obligation to provide under his private contract.
He used the county's secretaries to type information and letters on county time which
were part of his private obligations. He used county supplies and fax machines to
transmit information to Urbanik which was required of him by his private contract.
[State's Ex. 35 & 54; R. 617 pages 42-47 and R. 618 page 176 line 1-14]
One of Pearson's obligations under the private contract was to gather tonnage
information about material that was going into the county's landfill site. Waste material
was being gathered by county employees and trucksfromthe dumpster sites around the
Delta area pursuant to the county's program being administered by Pearson as Millard
County Administrator. Pearson was in charge of these employees of the county and the
trucks used to gather the waste. In this capacity, he ordered the county employee, Phil
Lovell, to weigh truck loads of waste picked up by him over a period of time. The truck
loads were weighed at the local IFA store and scales in Delta, Utah, which in turn sent a
bill for the cost of weighing the loads. Pearson then told Lovell to submit the bill to
6

Millard County for payment. Millard County did pay the bill. The information collected
was furnished by Pearson to Urbanik as part of the private obligation Pearson had under
his contract with Urbanik. [R. 618 page 295 line 13-25 and 296, 297; State's Ex. 46]
The value of these unauthorized uses of County services, was as follows; weighing
services were worth at least $75.00 [State's Ex. 46] and secretarial services were worth at
least $5.50 [Def.'s Ex. 56] for a total more than nominal but less than $100.00, a Class B
Misdomeanor pursuant to U.C.A 76-6-412(l)(d) in effect at that time.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Argument I: Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Pearson's ignorance of this law
is no excuse. Pearson's attempt to isolate out the requirement to file the sworn statement
and make the disclosures, as the only prohibited conduct under Section 17-16a-5 of the
Utah Code is not correct. Pearson was prohibited from affirmatively entering into the
contract in the first place. Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally in entering into the
contract with Urbanik where he knew he was employed by Millard County and that
Millard County had contracted with Urbanik to prepare the waste management plan.
Argument II: The State had no burden to prove that Pearson held guilty or
scienter knowledge or intent when he entered into the contract with Urbanik, and failed to
file the required sworn statement and disclose his private contract in public meeting.
Argument III: Lambert vs. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d
228 and related authority argued by Pearson in his Brief, that Pearson had to have had

7

actual knowledge of the requirements of Section 17-16a-5 has no application in this case.
Argument IV: The Jury was properly instructed concerning mens rea in this
case, where they were instructed according to the definitions found in the Utah Criminal
Code, Section 76-2-103(1) & (2) concerning both intentional conduct and knowing
conduct, and that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and
intentionally entered into the contract with Urbanik without filing the required sworn
statement and making the disclosure in public meeting.

Argument V: Pearson was correctly convicted of theft of services where he used
county secretaries and equipment to perform work required of him personally under his
private agreement with Urbanik and used his position as County Administrator to have a
county employee weigh truck loads of waste to generate information, and caused the cost
of doing so to be paid for by the county where the same was required of him personally
under the contract with Urbanik.
Argument VI: Under the evidence presented to the Jury, if necessary under the
law, it could have found that Pearson knew that he was required to file a sworn statement
and make a disclosure at a public meeting of the Millard County Commissioners before
he entered into the private agreement with Urbanik and knowingly and intentionally
failed to do so.
ARGUMENTS

8

Argument I
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-16a-5 prohibits both an act and an omission.
First, an act, in that it prohibits a public official from contracting with another who in
turn is contracting with the official's employer and second, an omission, if he does not
timely file his required sworn statement and make his disclosure in open meeting.
Pearson's ignorance of this law is no excuse. Pearson's position that a violation of this
Section, as charged in Count II of the Information, requires a mens rea or a mental
element is correct. But the law does not require that the State prove that he knew the
requirements of the Section charged, or put another way the law does not require that he
in fact be aware of the requirements of the Section and that he then violate the proscribed
conduct. The definition of knowing and intentional conduct makes this aspect of the law
very clear. U.C.A. Section 76-2-103(1) and (2) states;
"A person engages in conduct":
"(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of this conduct or to a result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the result."
"(2)" Knowingly or with knowledge, with respect to
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances..."
The "conduct" in this case was not just failing to file the sworn statement and
make the disclosure in public meeting, it included being the Millard County
Administrator, a public officer, and knowingly and intentionally entering into the private
9

contract with Urbanick to help him prepare the waste management plan, with knowledge
that Urbanik had contracted with Millard County to prepare the Plan for Millard County,
Pearson's employer. All the mens rea element of the offense required, was that Pearson
knowingly and intentionally entered into the conduct. Pearson's attempt to isolate out the
requirement to make the disclosures, as the only prohibited act is not correct. Pearson was
prohibited from affirmatively entering into the contract in the first place. Pearson acted
knowingly and intentionally in entering into the contract with Urbanik where he knew he
was employed by Millard County and that Millard County had contracted with Urbanik to
prepare the waste management plan.
Ignorance of the law is no excuse.4 U.C.A. Section 76-2-304 provides:
"§ 76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law
. . . .(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or
meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor
reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense,
and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's
4

21 Am Jurisprudence 2d, criminal Law Section 142. See Skeen vs. Craig, 86 P. 487,
where the Supreme Court of Utah said long ago that "Now, there is no principle of law more
closely adhered to and followed than the rule that every person is presumed to know the law;. ."
And also see People vs. Monk, 28 P. 115 where the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah said
". . . [F]or in general every person is presumed to know the law of the country in which he lives.
' And in no case can one enter a court of justice, to which he has been summoned in either a civil
or criminal proceeding, with the sole and naked defense that when he did the thing complained of
he did not know of the existence of the law which he violated,' nor that he believed the law to be
different from what it really was, nor even if he was misled by the advice of counsel. 1 Bish. Crim.
Law Section 209; Com. V. Bagley, 7 Pick. 281. Indeed, the strongest authorities cited by the
learned counsel hold that, where the law which has been infringed upon was settled and plain, this
maxim may be applied with vigor . . . "
10

reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a
written order or grant of permission by an administrative
agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in
question...."
Even if Pearson did not know about the requirement to file a sworn statement and
disclose his intent to contract with Urbanik, his ignorance of the law is not a defense
unless he can meet the provisos of the above Section. Pearson points to no reliance on
an official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an
administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in
question; or a written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of
record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question. NONE EXIST, the law in question does not designate anyone to issue
such a written statement, so there is none, nor is there a court opinion saying that
Pearson did not have to file the sworn statement and make the disclosure or that he had to
have had actual knowledge of the requirement before he could violate the Section.
Therefore Pearson's argument that his ignorance is an excuse is wrong, and his
ignorance, if it did exist, is no excuse. The fact that he acted knowingly and intentionally
in entering into the contract with Urbanik under the circumstances known to him means
he was and is guilty of Count II as determined by the Jury.
11

ARGUMENT II
Pearson argues in his Brief that the State had to prove that he had been advised
about the requirement of Section 17-16a-5 or that he in fact knew about the requirement
and with the knowledge he deliberately [knowingly and intentionally] failed to comply.
This argument is the same as saying the State had to prove he had guilty or scienter
knowledge or intent in failing to comply with the Section. The State did not need to
prove that Pearson acted with bad or scienter intent. In State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,
Larsen tried to argue that scienter was required to be proven in his case where he was
charged with violating the Utah securities laws. His criminal acts included his failure to
inform investors of material information related to the company. Like Pearson in this
subject case, Larsen argued that because the statute in question required that he act
"willfully" which has the same meaning as "intentionally95, the State needed to prove that
he acted with scienter intent. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and said;
"In determining whether we can, or should, give 'willftdly'
such a construction, we first look to the statutory definition of
'willful'. The legislature has indicated that a person acts
willfully when it is his or her 'desire to engage in the conduct
that causes[s] the result.' Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-103.
Nothing in this definition requires scienter. Moreover, a brief
survey of the Code confirms that the Utah legislature knows
how to require scienter, if it so desires, by including specific
language to that effect. See, e.g. id. Sections 23-20-27, 41la-1319, 76-6-506.2, 76-10-706 & -1006."
The Supreme Court in Larsen held that the mens rea requirement of "willful" conduct did
5

See U.C.A. Section 76-2-103(1).
12

not mean scienter intent, and neither should this Court find that the mens rea requirement
of an intentional act in this subject case inherently includes a requirement of scienter
intent as argued by Pearson.

Argument IIL
Pearson argues that Lambert vs. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct 240, 2 L.Ed.2d
228, is authority for his novel argument, that he had to have had knowledge of the
requirement to file a sworn statement and make a public disclosure. He also cites
questionable authority from a horn book of the law and a law school text book6 that is in
turn based primarily on Lambert vs. California. Whatever the holding was in Lambert,
the case is clearly distinguishable from this case. In Lambert the law in question
required that the defendant register as a felon while she resided in Los Angeles which she
was charged with failing to do. It was a passive registration law that did not require any
mental element or mens rea. The Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Douglas
said;
". . . [W]e deal here with conduct that is wholly passive-mere
failure to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the
failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to
the consequences of his deed, [citations omitted]. . . The rule
that 'ignorance of the law will not excuse' [citations
omitted]is deep in our law, as is the principle that of all the
powers of local government, the police power is 'one of the
least limitable.'[citations omitted]. On the other hand, due

6

LaFave, Criminal Law and Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law
13

process places some limits on its exercise. Engrained in our
concept of due process is the requirement of notice . . . [T]he
principle is . . . appropriate where a person, wholly passive
and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of
justice for condemnation in a criminal case
"
Lambert is distinguishable because in this subject case, the prohibition in Section
17-16a-5 is not wholly passive as argued above. It prohibits a public official from
intentionally and knowingly entering into a contract with some person who in turn is
doing business with his employer without filing a sworn statement and disclosing his
private contract at a public meeting. This is totally different from a passive requirement
that one register as a felon. Lambert is often quoted, but seldom followed in any case.
The narrow holding and authority of Lambert has been recognized by the Supreme Court
of Utah in State vs. Moore, 782 P.2d 497. The Court said;
" . . . [PJunishment of a person for a crime when
ignorant of the facts making it so does not involve a denial of
due process. The narrow exception to this rule is found
where legistation criminalized 'wholly passive' conduct by a
person who is 'unaware of any wrongdoing.'"

Pearson's crime or conduct fits within the class of crimes briefly mentioned by
Justice Douglas in the above quotation, where he said, speaking of a "wholly passive"
type of crime, "It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under
circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed, [citations
omitted]..." In this subject case, Pearson was in a special class of persons who should
have known. He was as appointed high-level public official in Millard County, and had
14

been so for many years. He knew he was the County Administrator, and he knew he was
in charge of the County waste collection and landfill program. He knew the state was
requiring the Counties to prepare a solid wast management plan. He knew the state was
sending down money to do so. He knew Urbanik had contracted to prepare the plan to
satisfy the guidelines and requirements of the state for Millard County. He knew he was
contracting with Urbanik to do part of the work and get half of the money privately.
Pearson should have been alerted, in the words of Justice Douglas, to the requirement of
the Section in the County Officers and Employees Disclosure Act. He was not just a
member of the public required by law to satisfy a wholly passive registration requirement.
As a Public Officer, in the position he was he held in Millard County, he had more of a
duty to know the law as it pertained to his public position and his private related
endeavor.
Argument IV
The Jury in this case was properly instructed in regards to the mens rea
requirements. As pointed out in Pearson's Brief, the Mens rea of Section 17-16a-5
charged in Count II is not set out in the section but rather in a general catchall section in
the Chapter, Section 17-16a-10 which says;"... any person who knowingly and
intentionally violates this part is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor...." In Instruction No.
7, Record page 535 the court instructed the Jury concerning the elements of Count II and
that one of the elements which needed to be found by the Jury beyond a reasonable doubt
was that Pearson;
15

"(4) did knowingly and intentionally receive or agree to receive compensation for
assisting Joe Urbanick, dba Stansbury Design Associates, in a transaction, to witpreparation of a solid wast management plan involving Millard County, (5) without filing
a sworn statement giving the information required by Utah Code Annotated Section 1716a-5(2-3), and without disclosing the same to the Millard County Commission in open
meeting"
At Instruction No. 19 at Record page 528 the court instructed the Jury that "A
person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result." A similar instruction was given defining "knowingly" at Instruction
No. 15 at Record page 527. These two instructions mirror the language of those terms
found in the Criminal Code at Section 76-2-103 quoted above.
Instructions defining "intentional" or "intentionally" that mirror the code's
definitions are sufficient instructions in a criminal case where they are necessary.
Again, the case of State vs. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 applicable authority for this argument,
particularly where Larsen was making very similar arguments about scienter intent as
does Pearson in this case.

Argument V
Count III of the Information charged Pearson with "theft of services", a Class B
misdemeanor. "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
16

over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof [ Utah Code
Annotated Section 76-6-404] "A person commits theft if, having control over the
disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the
services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to
them. [U.C.A. Section 76-6-409(2)] Pearson's acts fit squarely within the above
definitions of theft and theft of services. He was the Millard County Administrator, and
the person in charge of the Delta office for Millard County. He was the supervisor of the
Delta office and in that capacity had both Sheryl Dekker and Deb David perform
secretarial work for him personally on the private contract he had with Urbanik.[See
Sheryl Dekker's testimony at R. 617 page 38 and Deb David's testimony at page 60 and
also State's ex. 35 and 54] They were both hired by the county as secretaries and clerks
in the Delta office. They used county time and equipment to do Pearson's private work.
Pearson was also in charge of the county landfill and collection program. As the
one in charge he gave orders to Phil Lovell to weigh truck loads of material collected
from dumpster sites in order to gather information required of Pearson under his private
contract with Urbanik. Pearson then caused that the cost of doing so was paid by the
county, rather than it being an expense to him personally in his performance of his
contract with Urbanik. [R. 618 page 295 line 13-25 and 296, 297; State's Ex. 46]
Pearson used his authority over services of the county for his own benefit and for the
benefit of Urbanik in clear violation of the theft statutes quoted above.
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ARGUMENT VI
Under the evidence presented to the Jury, if necessary under the law, it could have
found that Pearson knew that he was required to file a sworn statement and make a
disclosure at a public meeting of the Millard County Commissioners before he entered
into the private agreement with Urbanik and knowingly and intentionally failed to do so.
Prior to this incident, Pearson had been the Millard County Administrator for
many years. After he first came to work, he was given more and more responsibility. [R
617 page 7, line 15-25] During the year 1986 he was put in charge of the Millard County
solid waste management system by authority of Ordinance 152 and that responsibility
continued during all times relevant to this case, along with his other duties as Millard
Comity Administrator. [See Pearson's own comments about his job and role, speaking for
and on behalf of Millard County, [R. 618, page 71 line 5-25, and page 72 linel-15] & [
Ex. 47 and R. 617 page 13, 14 &25 line 16-25.] Pearson was an experienced public
administrator, and was the person in Millard County who was the expert in such
matters. [See R. 618 page 218] The Jury could have found that such an experienced and
knowledgable public administrator would be aware of the requirements of U.C.A. Section
17-16a-5 and knowingly and intentionally failed to follow the requirements.
Pearson was reminded of the need to follow the state law in question in the very
beginning of the State program to develop a state wide solid waste plan from county plans
to be submitted. Keith Burnett testified that he was the program manager with the State
Division of Community Development, in May of 1991. These were the State people who
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divided up and sent out the $400,000.00 dollars to the counties to pay for the cost of
preparing the county plans. [R. 618, page 92, 93, 94] Mr. Burnett was aware that Urbanik
was contracting with Millard County to prepare the County's plan. He also talked to
Pearson during this initial period of development about Pearson helping Urbanik prepare
the plan for Millard County.7 This information was developed during Pearson's
attorney's cross-examination of Mr. Burnett. [See R. 618, page 105, line 15-25 and page
106 line 1-5.]
At page 106 line 2, the witness testified that; "The discussion was, Mr. Pearson
asked me if there would be a problem with him doing some subcontracting work with the
prime contractor. I indicated that there was no problematic problem with that if all
other requirements under state law are met" (Emphasis added) From this evidence
alone, the Jury could have found that Pearson was put on notice of the law, was aware of
the law, and knowingly and intentionally ignored it by not filing the required sworn
statement and make the required disclosure in open meeting.
November the 19th, 1991 was an important day in the evidence in this case. It
was the day that Pearson called Urbanik about doing the solid waste management plan
together after he had talked to Mr. Burnett on the telephone. It was a county commission
meeting day. It was also the day that the matter was first mentioned to the county
commission during a commission meeting. [See commission minutes dated November 19,

7

This was about November, 1991. [See R. 618, page 111 line 8-14] Urbanik pegged the
date as about November 19, 1991. [See R. 618, page 132 line 6-19]
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1991; Ex. 41, page 2] The commission minutes noted that discussion, about the
"Approval of Contract with Division of Community Development Plan, Regarding Solid
Wast Management Plan", was brought up by Robyn Pearson, the defendant herein. The
minute entry mentions that "Approval was made of the contract with the Division of
Community Development Plan regarding the Solid Waste Management Plan. The
commission discussed the possibility of contracting with an engineer, who might in turn
sub-contract with Robyn Pearson. He will work on this project on his own time. " This
evidence told the Jury that Robyn Pearson knew that by law he needed to advise the
commission about his agreement with Urbanik at the very outset. The clear insinuation of
the discussion is that it was brought up and discussed by Pearson himself. He is the one
who told the commission. There was no reason for him to mention the possibility in the
future to the commission, except that he knew the requirements of the law. Based on this
clear implication in the evidence before the Jury, along with the other implications
discussed above, the Jury could have found that Pearson knew the requirements of the
Section in question and that he knowingly and intentionally failed to do so when the time
came for him to satisfy those requirements. The evidence before the Jury was that the
agreement with Urbanik had been discussed between the commissioners and him on June
22, 1992. On that date Urbanik presented himself to the County Commission talking
about Senate Bill 255 and the need to prepare a county solid waste management plan to
be submitted to the State. Pearson was present and took part in the discussions.[See Ex.
42, page 4.] On the very next day Urbanik signed the agreement between himself and the
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county, [See Ex. 18] and sent a letter to Pearson agreeing to split the money with
him.[See Ex. 26] The agreement was then not signed by the county until July 6, 1992.
[See Ex. 18]. On that date Pearson was present at the commission meeting where the
agreement was reviewed and approved and the agreement was signed. [See Ex. 45 page
3] Pearson did not make any disclosure to the commission about his agreement to receive
half of the money, which had been previously agreed upon between him and Urbanik as
memorialized in Urbanik's letter of June 23, 1992, Ex. 26. Based on this evidence the
Jury could have found that Pearson deliberately failed to disclose his agreement with
Urbanik and file the required sworn statement.

CONCLUSION
Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Pearson's ignorance of this law is no excuse.
Pearson's attempt to isolate out the requirement to file the sworn statement and make the
disclosures, as the only prohibited conduct by Section 17-16a-5 of the Utah Code is not
correct. Pearson was prohibited from affirmatively entering into the contract in the first
place. Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally in entering into the contract with
Urbanik where he knew he was employed by Millard County and that Millard County
had contracted with Urbanik to prepare the waste management plan. The State had no
burden to prove that Pearson held bad or scienter intent when he entered into the contract
with Urbanik, failed to file the required sworn statement and disclose his private contract
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in public meeting. Lambert vs. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228
and related authority argued by Pearson in his Brief, that Pearson had to have had actual
knowledge of the requirements of Section 17-16a-5 has no application in this case. The
Jury was properly instructed concerning mens rea in this case, where they were instructed
according to the definitions found in the Utah Criminal Code, Section 76-2-103(1) & (2)
concerning both intentional conduct and knowing conduct, and that the State had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally entered into the contract
with Urbanik without filing the required sworn statement and making the disclosure in
public meeting.
Pearson was correctly convicted of theft of services where he used county
secretaries and equipment to perform work required of him personally under his private
agreement with Urbanik and used his position as County Administrator to have a county
employee weigh truck loads of waste to generate information, and caused the cost of
doing so to be paid for by the county where the same was required of him personally
under the contract with Urbanik.
Under the evidence presented to the Jury, if necessary under the law, it could have
found that Pearson knew that he was required to file a sworn statement and make a
disclosure at a public meeting of the Millard County Commissioners before he entered
into the private agreement with Urbanik and knowingly and intentionally failed to do so.
Dated this 5"Day of

peAh~

Dexter L Anderson
Chief Millard County Deputy Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, herby certify that I have served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee on
the following persons, by mailing the same United States mail, postage prepaid, on the
S
Day of ^cXr
, 1999, to the following persons.
Kenneth R. Brown
Attorney for Appellant
210 Clift Building
10 West 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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State of Utah

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
Norman H Bangerter

324 South State Suite 300 Box 7
Salt Lake City Utah 84111
801 538-8722

92 2072
Contract #
Applicant Millard County
Project
solid waste plans
Org Code
7970 - HWASTE

CONTRACT
PERMANENT COMMUNITY IMPACT FUND BOARD
STATE OF UTAH

Department of Cn—imity and Economic Development
Division of Community Development Services

This contract is entered into by and between the State of Utah, Department
of Community & Economic Development, Division of Community Development
Services, Permanent Community Impact Fund Board (hereinafter the "BOARD") and

HTUMD (WronT, TTTAff
an applicant under the provisions contained in Chapter 52, Title 63, Utah
Code, (hereinafter the "CONTRACTOR"). Pursuant to the provisions of that
Statute, and the powers and functions of the Permanent Community Impact Fund
Board, the BOARD hereby finds and determines, based upon the formal
application of the CONTRACTOR, the evidence provided by the CONTRACTOR to the
BOARD and its staff, and information developed by the BOARD in its own
investigations and. at the hearings on the application of the CONTRACTOR, the
following, that:

1.

Pursuant to Section 17-15-23, and Section 63-52-3(6), Utah Code
Unannotated (1990), the CONTRACTOR:
A.

Is a county or entity created or designated by a county for the
purpose of preparing a county solid waste management plan;

B.

That the monies sought by the CONTRACTOR are for the preparation
of a county solid waste management plan;

C.

That the CONTRACTOR meets and complies with the criteria set by
Statute and by the BOARD for the providing of money to
applicants.
•2b
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2.

Pursuant to Section 63-52-3(6) Utah Code Unannotated (1990), the
BOARD has reviewed the usages of the funds allocated to the
CONTRACTOR, and that the usages are within the proper purposes
Chapter 52, Title 63, Utah Code, and the allocation of money to the
CONTRACTOR is within the proper prioritization of the BOARD and meets
all the criteria and requirements of the rules and statutes involved.

Based upon these findings, the BOARD is authorized and empowered to, and
does hereby, enter into the following agreement with the CONTRACTOR.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.

The BOARD shall provide the CONTRACTOR the amount of & 11,985.00
(CONTRACT AMOUNT) as described in Exhibit-1, Grant Provisions.

2.

The CONTRACTOR shall complete the Project described in Exhibit-2,
Work Description, within the CONTRACT PERIOD listed in Exhibit-11
Grant Provisions.

3.

The CONTRACTOR shall comply with the grant provisions identified in
Exhibit-1, Grant Provisions.

4.

Payment by the BOARD is subject to availability of state funds.

5.

The CONTRACTOR shall notify the BOARD in writing of any proposed
modification the Project which alters Exhibit-1f Work Description
and/or amount to ten percent (10.0%) or more of the total CONTRACT
AMOUNT. If such notification is not received, the BOARD reserves the
right to disallow the cost of the proposed modification and to
request return of its funds. This in no way should be construed so
as to allow any surplus funds to be expended on items not related to
the specifically approved project.

6.

All unused funds must be returned to the
surplus to the BOARD shall be applied as
outstanding loan principle• However, if
funds to the project, the returned funds
reduction of that grant.

7.

The CONTRACTOR shall maintain, available for audit and inspection,
records of expenditures relating to this contract until all audits
initiated by State auditors are completed, or for a period of four
(4) years after termination of this contract, whichever is longer.

8.

The CONTRACTOR shall comply with all laws which normally govern its
affairs in regard to contracts, fiscal procedure, and fair bidding
procedures.

9.

If work on the project has not commenced within 90 days after having
received final approval, then this contract may be cancelled by
written notice from the BOARD to the CONTRACTOR. No work completed
after receipt of the notice shall be reimbursable. The project must
be completed within the specified contract period.

2>7
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BOARD. Funds returned as
prepayment of a contract's
the BOARD has given grant
shall be applied as a

10.

The CONTRACTOR shall indemnify and hold harmless the State of Utah,
the Department of Community & Economic Development, the Division of
Community Development Services, the Permanent Community Impact Fund
Board and their officers, agents, and employees from and against any
and all loss, damage, injury, liability, and claims, including claims
for personal injury or death, damages to personal property and liens
of workmen and materialmen, howsoever caused, resulting directly or
indirectly from the performance of this agreement by the CONTRACTOR,
including attorneys fees and costs in the investigation or defense of
any claim, whether or not the claim has merit.

11.

The CONTRACTOR is an independent contractor, and, as such, shall have
no authorization, express or implied, to bind the State of Utah, the
Department of Community & Economic Development, the Division of
Community Development Services, or the Permanent Community Impact
Fund Board to any agreement, settlement, liability, or understanding
whatsoever, nor to perform any acts as agent for the State of Utah,
except as herein expressly set forth.

12.

CONTRACTOR expenditures under this contract determined by audit to be
ineligible for reimbursement because they were not authorized by the
terms and conditions of the contract, or that are inadequately
documented, and for which payment has been made to the CONTRACTOR,
will be immediately refunded to the BOARD by the CONTRACTOR. The
CONTRACTOR further agrees that the BOARD shall have the right to
withhold any or all subsequent payments under this or other contracts
to CONTRACTOR until recoupment of overpayment is made.

13.

This contract may be altered, modified, or supplemented only by
written amendment, executed by the parties hereto, and attached to
the original signed copy of this agreement. No claim for services
furnished by the CONTRACTOR, not specifically authorized by this
Agreement will be allowed by the BOARD.

14.

If it is determined that in any manner the loan or grant was
improperly made or entered into, or if the monies are or were used
improperly or contrary to the terms of this agreement, the CONTRACTOR
shall pay to the BOARD the amount of all monies and benefits received
by the CONTRACTOR by and through the BOARD.

zs
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EXECUTION

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority contained in Chapter 15, Title 17
and Chapter 52, Title 63, Utah Code Unannotated (1990). the parties hereto
mutually agree to perform this agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this agreement on
the lQ- dav of
V LM.r.nU-t^
, 19 c(\ . This contract will take
effect upon approval as evidenced by the appropriate signatures.
CONTRACTOR

STATE

MTTTARn ranNTT. UTAH

BY;

XM

t

APPROVED - DIVISION OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

Keith J^BJbumett
Permanent Community Impact
Fund Board
(signature)

JER'E SRINKERHQFF. CHAIRMAN
Olene^STWalker, Director
Community Development

APPROVED - DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
fc ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

WITNESS
Bv
I

(signature)
Sandra Z. UaegUr

MARLENE WHICKER. COUNTY CLERK

0K

DCED Budget Office

MILLARD COUNTY
60 SOUTH MAIN STREET
FILLMORE. UTAH

APPROVED/,- Availability of Funds

84631

APPROVED - DIVISION OF FINANCE
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JURAT
COUNTIES
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF MILLARD
On the

\9 '

)

day of

V ^KVnU&\^

1991, personally appeared before me

JER'E BRINKERHOFF

and

MARLENE WHICKER

f

who being by me duly sworn did say that they are the
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
respectively, of

and

COUNTY CLERK .

MILLARD COUNTY . a political subdivision of the State of

Utah, and that the attached instrument was signed in behalf of said County by
authority of a motion of its Board of County Commissioners passed on the
f? '

day of

V \HXnJMA~

, 1991 and said persons acknowledged

to me that said County executed the same.

"7 JM?n*.<T9ut?iMu

&ftojfy

litUu&/ d&Jl

Notary Public, residing at

My Commission Expires:
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

324 South State Suite 500
Salt Lake City Utah 84111
801)538-8722

AMENDMENT TO CONTRACT #

92-2072

TO BE ATTACHED TO AND MADE PART of the above numbered Contract By and between the
Department of Community and Economic Development, Division of Community Development Services,
Permanent Community Impact Fund Board, and MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH.
The TERMINATION DATE and the WORK DESCRIPTION are amended as shown on the attached page.
ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONSITIONS OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT REMAIN THE SAME.
IN WITNESS THEREOF, the parties sign and cause this amendment to be effective
OCTOBER 1. 1992.
CONTRACTOR

STATE

MILLARD COUNTY. UTAH

APPROVED - DIVISION OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

Keith J Buniett
PermanenrCommunity Impact
Fund Board

(signature)
JER'E BRINKERHOFF. CHAIRMAN
MILLARD COUNTY COMMISSION
By:

A. Barclay Ga^chfsr
DCED Deputy Executive Director
WTTNESS

By: 9 ^ 3 ^ ^ ^

'Z^Lfe^^

(signature)
MARLENE WHICKER. COUNTY CLERK

Sandra Z. (Naegle
DCED Financial Manager

MILLARD COUNTY
60 SOUTH MAIN STREET
APPROVED - DIVISION OF FINANCE
FILLMORE. UTAH 84631
^Director
/
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CONTRACT AMENDMENT
First amendment to CONTRACT #
I.

92-2072

TERMINANTION DATE
Termination date of this contract is extended to

U.

MARCH 31. 1994

WORK DESCRD7TCON

On or before June 1, 1993, the CONTRACTOR shall submit a county solid waste management
plan the the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board
(SHWCB) for review and acceptance of said plan.
At a minimum said plan shall contain the submissions called for in SHWCB's Administrative
Rule R315-30Z, "County Solid Waste Planning".

3 2_

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
Michael O. Leavitt

324 South State Suite 500
Salt Lake City Utah 84114 7910
(801)538-8722
FAX (801)538 8888

October 6, 1992
MEMORANDUM

TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:

COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRS & COUNTY CLERKS
PERMANENT COMMUNITY IMPACT FUND BOARD
AMENDMENT TO SOLID WASTE PLANNING CONTRACTS

Enclosed are four copies of an amendment for your contract with the PCIFB for the development
of a county solid waste management plan. This amendment changes the submission date of the plan to
the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) from the original December 1, 1992 to June 1, 1993.
The amendment also specifies the plan is to be in conformance with the formally adopted administrative
rules of DEQ covering county solid waste management plans.
The following instructions are provided as assistance.
1.

All four copies must be signed and returned. You will be sent a fully executed copy of
the amendment for your files.

2.

The CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION must sign for the county on the
"BY" line on page 1. The COUNTY CLERK must sign as the "WITNESS" on page 1.

Your timely assistance on this matter will be appreciated, If you require additional assistance
concerning the contract, please contact this office at 538-8725.
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EXHIBIT-1
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GRANT PROVISIONS

I.

COST SHARING
A. ESTIMATED TOTAL PROJECT COST

*

11.985.00

B. PROGRAM REVENUES
Federal Funds

$

0.00

Local Funds

*

0.00

PCIB Funds

$

11.985.00

Other Funds
(list by source)

*,
$_.
*

Total Revenues

II.

$_

l.U985tQQ

PAYMENTS

1. CONTRACTOR shall be provided a stun of A 11.985.00 (Contract Aaotmt) on
the following schedule:
a. Ninety percent (90.OX) of the Contract Amount, a sum not more than
it 10.785.00. shall be forwarded to CONTRACTOR upon execution of this
contract and submission by CONTRACTOR of a signed Request for Funds.
b. Ten percent (10.0%) of the Contract Amount, a sum not more than
i
1.200.00. shall be forwarded to CONTRACTOR upon acceptance of the
county solid waste plan by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste
Committee and submission by CONTRACTOR of a signed Request for Funds.

III.

TERMINATION DATE

1. This Contract shall expire

JUNE 301 1993

-6-
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EXHIBIT-2
WORK DESCRIPTION

On or before December 1, 1992, the CONTRACTOR shall submit a county solid
waste management plan to the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Solid
and Hazardous Waste Control Board (SHWCB) for its acceptance. At a minimum
this plan shall contain the submissions called for in the "Draft Guidelines
for County Solid Waste Management Plans" issued by SHWCB in July 1991.
In compliance with Section 63-46af UCA, SHWCB is required to formally
adopt the "Draft Guidelines" as an administrative rule. Should substantial
modifications to the "Draft Guidelines" result from the administrative rule
making process, the BOARD shall issued such modifications as amendments to
this contract*

Js-

ADDENDUM B
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PROFESSIOIAL SERVICES
AGREENEKT
STAISBORY DESIGN
ASSOCIATES

.Millard County CorporarJjQi]
/
hereinafter
CLIENT,
a
t^H y p n i i i - i r
ggXE8XX££&H/ does hereby a u t h o r i z e STANSBDRY
DESIGN ASSOCIATES, h e r e i n a f t e r CONSULTANT, t o p r o v i d e t h e s e r v i c e s s e t f o r t h
below, s u b j e c t t o t h e t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s s e t f o r t h below and on t h e r e v e r s e
side thereof.
A.

Client Information
Client Name:
Millard County Corporation
Representative: Robyn Pearson, Administrator
Address:
71 South 200 West, Box 854
Delta, Utah 84624
Phone:
864-2068
Client P.O. #: n/a
Owner of Property Involved: n/a
Credit Ref.: n/a

B.

Project Description (Attach additional sheets if reqd.)
Project Name/Location: Millard County Solid Waste Management Plan,
Millard County, Utah.
Description of CONSULTANT'S Services: Provide solid waste management
planning services to comply with the requirements of S.B.-255, (Utah
Solid Waste Management Act) The scope of services is based upon the
Guidelines for County Solid Waste Management Plans and rules adopted
by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Board for such plans.

C.

Compensation
1.

Basis (Check and complete (1).
Hourly Fee & Reimbursable Expense
Lump Sum + Fixed Fee with Progress Payments
v Fixed Fee $11,983.00
Other (Attach additional sheet-specify)

2.

CLIENT shall pay a retainage fee of $ n/a
, which fee
shall be paid in full prior to commencement of the work
herein contemplated.
Said fee shall be applied to
CLIENT'S final payment for the services provided
hereunder.

D.

Consultant shall commence services upon CLIENT'S execution of the
Agreement. Services shall be completed within the time interval
specified above.

E.

Having read, understood and agreed to the foregoing, and the terms
and conditions set forth on the reverse side hereof and hereby
incorporated into and made a part of this agreement, CLIENT and
CONSULTANT, by and through their authorized representatives, have
subscribed their names hereon effective the date set forth above.

CLIENT

STANSmjRY DESIGN ASSOCIATES
Joseph A. Urbanik
Principal

-y-L-r^

(ojzz fcz.

1.1

1.2

ARTICLE i. DEFINITIONS
Hourly Fee:
The hourly f e e f o r each employee engaged on t h e Project, as a t t a c h e d and
referenced a s Exhibit A, shall be t h e s o l e b a s i s of c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r employees
of Stansbury Design A s s o c i a t e s u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e a u t h o r i z e d by t h e Client, plus
reimbursable expenses, a s f o l l o w s
Reimbursable Expenses:
Expenditures made by Consultant, i t s employees o r i t s c o n s u l t a n t s i n t h e
i n t e r e s t o f t h e Project. Reimbursable Expenses i n c l u d e b u t a r e n o t l i m i t e d to:
A. Expense o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , s u b s i s t e n c e and l o d g i n g when t r a v e l i n g in
connection with the project.
B, Expense of long d i s t a n c e or t o l l t e l e p h o n e c a l l s , telegrams, messenger s e r v i c e ,
f i e l d o f f i c e expense, and f e e s paid f o r s e c u r i n g a p p r o v a l of a u t h o r i t i e s having
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e Project.
C
Expense o f a l l r e p r o d u c t i o n s , p o s t a g e and handling of drawings,
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , r e p o r t s or o t h e r P r o j e c t r e l a t e d i n s t r u m e n t s of s e r v i c e of t h e
Consultant.
D. Expense of computer time i n c l u d i n g charges for p r o p r i e t a r y programs.
E. Expense o f preparing p e r s p e c t i v e s , renderings o r models.
ARTICLE 2. COMPENSATION

2J.

Progress Payments:
Client w i l l b e i n v o i c e d a t t h e end o f t h e f i r s t c a l e n d a r month f o l l o w i n g t h e
e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f t h i s agreement and a t t h e end of e a c h month t h e r e a f t e r . Such
i n v o i c e s s h a l l r e f l e c t b i l l i n g f o r work performed by C o n s u l t a n t during t h e month
i n v o i c e d . Payment on an i n v o i c e i s due upon r e c e i p t o f t h e i n v o i c e by Client.
In t h e e v e n t o f a d i s p u t e regarding an i n v o i c e , C l i e n t s h a l l pay a l l u n d i s p u t e d
amounts a s per t h i s A r t i c l e .

2.2

Late Payment:
Consultant may a s s e s s a c a r r y i n g charge of 1.5 p e r c e n t per month on p r o g r e s s
payments n o t made w i t h i n (30) days o f t h e d a t e of i n v o i c e , which charge C l i e n t
warrants w i l l be paid upon demand. Consultant may, i n i t s s o l e d i s c r e t i o n and
w i t h o u t n o t i c e , suspend or t e r m i n a t e i t s s e r v i c e s under t h i s agreement should
Client n o t s a t i s f y any amount i n v o i c e d w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e (45) d a y s of t h e d a t e
of i n v o i c e . C o n s u l t a n t f u r t h e r r e s e r v e s t h e r i g h t t o w i t h h o l d from C l i e n t any
i n s t r u m e n t s o f C o n s u l t a n t s s e r v i c e , or c o p i e s t h e r e o f , d e v e l o p e d f o r Client
under t h i s agreement pending payment on C l i e n t s o u t s t a n d i n g i n d e b t e d n e s s .
ARTICLE 3. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

3.1

A p p l i c a b l e Law:

3.2

This agreement shall be interpreted and enforced according to the laws of the
State of Utah.
Assignment: Subcontracting:

3.3

N e i t h e r C l i e n t o r Consultant shall a s s i g n i t s i n t e r e s t in t h i s agreement w i t h o u t
t h e w r i t t e n c o n s e n t of t h e o t h e r , e x c e p t t h a t Consultant may s u b c o n t r a c t any
p o r t i o n of i t s s e r v i c e s w i t h o u t such consent.
Force Majeure:
Any delay or d e f a u l t in the performance of any obi i g a t i o n of e i t h e r party under
t h i s agreement r e s u l t i n g from any cause(s) beyond s a i d party's reasonable
c o n t r o l , s h a l l not be deemed a breach of t h i s agreement. The o c c u r r e n c e of any
such e v e n t s h a l l suspend the o b l i g a t i o n s of said p a r t y as long as performance
is delayed or p r e v e n t e d hereby.

A t t o r n e y s Fees:
In t h e event of d e f a u l t hereunder, the d e f a u l t i n g party agrees t o p**y all c o s t s
incurred by t h e non-defaulting party in e n f o r c i n g t h i s agreement, i n c l u d i n g
reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s fees, whether i n c u r r e d through i n i t i a t i o n of legal
proceedings or otherwise.
S e v e r a b i l i t y Waiver:
In t h e e v e n t any provision(s) of t h i s agreement s h a l l be held t o be i n v a l i d or
unenforceable, t h e remaining p r o v i s i o n s s h a l l remain v a l i d and binding upon t h e
p a r t i e s . One o r more waiver of any term, c o n d i t i o n or o t h e r p r o v i s i o n of t h i s
agreement by e i t h e r p a r t y s h a l l not be c o n s t r u e d a s a w a i v e r o f a s u b s e q u e n t
breach o f t h e same or any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n .
Amendments: Mergertek
T h i s agreement may be amended on by w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t e x p r e s s l y r e f e r r i n g
h e r e t o and duly signed by t h e p a r t i e s . T h i s agreement c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e n t i r e
and i n t e g r a t e d agreement between t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o and s u p e r s e d e s a l l p r i o r
n e g o t i a t i o n s , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and/or agreements, w r i t t e n or o r a l .
ARTICLE 4. SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Additional Services:
S e r v i c e s not e x p r e s s l y or i m p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e d w i t h t h o s e h e r e i n s p e c i f i e d , as
determined by Consultant, are not c o v e r e d by t h i s agreement. Such s e r v i c e s may
be p r o v i d e d o n l y upon e x e c u t i o n of amendment in c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h i s
agreement.
Termination:
T h i s agreement may be terminated by e i t h e r p a r t y upon s e v e n (7) days w r i t t e n
n o t i c e should t h e o t h e r p a r t y f a i l s u b s t a n t i a l l y t o perform i n accordance w i t h
t h i s agreement thorough no f a u l t o f t h e p a r t y i n i t i a t i n g t h e t e r m i n a t i o n . This
agreement may be terminated by C l i e n t upon a l e a s t s e v e n (7) d a y s w r i t t e n n o t i c e
t o t h e Consultant in t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e P r o j e c t i s permanently abandoned. If
t h i s agreement i s terminated through no f a u l t o f t h e Consultant, Client s h a l l
pay Consultant f o r s e r v i c e s performed and Reimbursable Expenses incurred in
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s agreement and, upon r e q u e s t , a Termination Adjustment
e q u a l l i n g f i f t e e n percent (15%) of t h e e s t i m a t e d f e e remaining t o be earned a t
t h e t i m e of t e r m i n a t i o n t o a c c o u n t f o r Consultant's r e s c h e d u l i n g adjustments,
reassignment o f personnel and r e l a t e d c o s t s i n c u r r e d due t o t e r m i n a t i o n .
Representatives
C o n s u l t a n t and C l i e n t shall each d e s i g n a t e i n w r i t i n g a person(s) a u t h o r i z e d t o
a c t a s t h e i r R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ^ ) . Said R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h a l l r e c e i v e and examine
documents s u b m i t t e d by t h e o t h e r p a r t y and s h a l l i n t e r p r e t and d e f i n e t h e i r
firm's p o l i c i e s and render d e c i s i o n s and a u t h o r i z a t i o n s promptly t o p r e v e n t
unreasonable d e l a y i n t h e progress of t h e P r o j e c t . Said R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h a l l
s e r v e a s s o l e i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between C o n s u l t a n t and C l i e n t .
C l i e n t Information:
Consultant s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o rely on any and a l l i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d t o
Consultant by o r through Client, and s h a l l not have a d u t y t o v e r i f y t h e
a c c u r a c y of s u c h information unless o t h e r w i s e agreed herein. C l i e n t shall hold
harmless, indemnify and defend Consultant a s t o any claims r e l a t e d , d i r e c t l y or
i n d i r e c t l y , t o Consultants use of or r e l i a n c e upon any such information.
Limitation of Liability:
C l i e n t l i m i t s Consultant's l i a b i l i t y t o C l i e n t and all c o n t r a c t o r s or
s u b c o n t r a c t o r s on t h e Project which may a r i s e from or be due d i r e c t l y or
i n d i r e c t l y t o the professional a c t s , e r r o r s and/or omissions, including
n e g l i g e n c e , of Consultant, i t s agents, employees or c o n s u l t a n t s such t h a t
Consultants a g g r e g a t e l i a b i l i t y t o such p a r t i e s does not exceed Consultant's f e e
or $50,000, whichever i s greater.
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Stansbury Design Associates
128 COUNTRY CLUB
STANSBURY PARK, UTAH, 84074

TELEPHONE (801) 560-7766
(801) 882-3031

June 23, 1992
Millard County Corporation
% Robyn Pearson, Administrator
71 South 200 West
Box 854
Delta, Utah 84624
Dear Robyn:
Enclosed a partial billing and short form contract for
services rendered on the Millard County Waste Management Plan.
This billing is predicated on our discussion with the County
Commission on June 22, 1992.
As discussed, Stansbury Design
Associates will contract with Millard County for the amount
authorized to the County ($11,983) by the Community Impact Board.
Stansbury Design Associates shall retain your services by
means of a subcontract for contributions of effort performed on the
project. It is anticipated that you will responsible for various
elements of the planning process to include; site inventory data,
waste generation data, financial
documentation
and public
participation activities. As agreed, we submit that the 50% share
of fee(s) charged to the county between yourself and our firm is
appropriate.
The amount requested is for 25% of $11,983.00 = $2,995.75 for
site mapping, inventory, waste inventory and
waste generation
projections.
Should you have any questions or need additional
information, please call.

Joseph A. Urbanik
Enclosure:

QO

STANSBURY DESIGN ASSOCIATES
June 23, 1992
Services rendered for Millard County Waste Management Plan
from November, 1991 through June; 1, 1992:
25% of Lump Sum Bid of $11,983.00

Please remit to:
Stansbury Design Associates
128 Country Club
Stansbury Park, Utah 84074

<-il

$2,995.75

State of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
C. Dean Larsen, Defendant and Petitioner

No. 920114
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
865 P.2d 1355, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
December 17, 1993, Filed
Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable Leonard H. Russon

COUNSEL
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., David B. Thompson, Asst. Attfy Gen., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Larry R. Keller, John T. Nielsen, David L. Arlington, Joel G. Momberger, Jon E. Waddoups,
Melyssa D. Davidson, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
JUDGES
ZIMMERMAN, Howe, Durham, Frederick, Rokich
AUTHOR: ZIMMERMAN
OPINION
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
C. Dean Larsen petitioned for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of a Utah Court of Appeals
decision upholding the district court's rulings on two issues relating to his conviction on eighteen
counts of criminal securities fraud. Larsen contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct
the jury that the intent to defraud, deceive, or manipulate is an element of a criminal violation of
sections 1(2) and 21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2), -21.
Larsen also complains that the trial court erroneously allowed a State expert to testify as to the
"materiality" of information that Larsen allegedly had failed to disclose to investors. We affirm his
convictions.
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The facts of this case are detailed in the court of appeals1 opinion in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d
487, 488-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To summarize, Larsen was charged with, and convicted of,
eighteen counts of securitiesfraudunder sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 of the Code. These
convictions arose out of his actions while president of a real estate development company in
which others had invested. Larsen's criminal acts included his failure to inform investors of
material information related to the company, misrepresentations of material facts regarding the
company'sfinancialstatus, and related acts of dishonesty. Larsen appealed to the court of appeals,
which affirmed his convictions. 828 P.2d at 496. We granted certiorari to consider his claims of
legal error.
Larsen first asserts that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the applicable law.
He alleges that the trial court improperly refused to give portions of his proposed instructions
concerning the elements of and defenses to criminal securitiesfraud.The omitted portions, in
substance, would have instructed the jury that to be guilty of a criminal violation of section
61-1-1(2), Larsen must have acted with the specific intent to defraud and that a representation
made "in good faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of securities fraud."
The propriety of the instructions given hinges on the correct interpretation of sections
61-1-1(2) and -21. 11 In particular, does a criminal violation of these sections require proof of an
intent to defraud, deceive, or manipulate? The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of
law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); Ward v.
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
When faced with a question of statutory construction, this court first examines the plain
language of the statute. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991);
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Section 61-1-1(2) states in
relevant part:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly to:

(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). T 2 This section's standards govern both civil and criminal
liability. To ascertain the elements of a criminal violation, however, this section must be read in
conjunction with section 61-1-21, which specifies the requisite mental state and penalties for a
criminal violation. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. Section 61-1-21 provides in pertinent part:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter [including section
61-1-1(2)]... or who willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter . . . shall upon
conviction be fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (emphasis added). The plain language of section 61-1-21 requires
that to be liable for a criminal violation of section 61-1-1(2), the defendant must have acted
"willfully" in misstating or omitting material facts. Id. Larsen asks this court to interpret "willfully"
as requiring "scienter," the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, as defined by the United
States Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a rule 10b-5 case.
In determining whether we can, or should, give "willfully" such a construction, we first look
to the statutory definition of "willful." The legislature has indicated that a person acts willfully
when it is his or her "desire to engage in the conduct that cause[s] the result." Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-103. Nothing in this definition requires scienter. 13 Moreover, a brief survey of the Code
confirms that the Utah legislature knows how to require scienter, if it so desires, by including
specific language to that effect. See, e.g., id. §§ 23-20-27, 41-la-1319, 76-6-506.2, 76-10-706 &
-1006.
Failing to find support in the express terms of the Code, Larsen suggests that the scienter
requirement is an "independent element" of the offense. Stated another way, although it is not
apparent from the language of the provision, Larsen contends that we should read the scienter
requirement into the statute. We have rejected similar attempts to engraft a judicially created
intent requirement upon the plain language of a criminal statute. E.g., State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d
1314, 1315 (Utah 1983) (holding offense of writing bad check does not require intent to defraud).
Perhaps more on point, other states have rejected attempts to import scienter into analogous
securities-fraud statutes. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1369, 262 Cal. Rptr. 366,
369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Temby, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Wis. Ct. App.
1982). This court will not affix new "independent requirements" to an otherwise clear and
constitutional statute.
Although the language of the statute effectively disposes of the issue, Larsen asserts that this
court should look beyond the plain language of the Utah Uniform Securities Act to the legislative
intent. Section 61-1-27 of the Code provides that Utah's Uniform Securities Act "may be
construed so as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related
federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. Larsen asserts that this section was intended to
bind state judicial interpretations of Utah's antifraud provisions to the United States Supreme
Court's interpretations of similar federal securities provisions. Specifically, Larsen argues that the
language similarities between section 61-1-1(2) and rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), when viewed in light of the intent requirement embodied in section
61-1-27, require this court to interpret Utah's antifraud provision in conformity with the Supreme
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Hochfelder held, inter alia,
that "scienter," or an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, must be proved before civil liability
can be imposed under rule 10b-5. See id. at 674; Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S.
680, 692 (1980). Larsen's argument is facially legitimate and requires response.
We first examine Hochfelder's reasoning. The issue before the Hochfelder court was
"whether a private cause of action for damages [would] lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the
absence of any allegation of'scienter'-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. The SEC
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promulgated rule 10b-5 14 pursuant to powers vested in it by section 10(b) 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). Id. at 195. The Court ultimately determined that scienter is
required because the language of section 10 (b)--the statutory authority upon which rule 10b-5 is
grounded—implicitly limited the SEC's power to promulgate an implementing rule to one that
required scienter. Id. at 213-14; see also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690; 2 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law
of Securities Regulation § 13.4, at 81 (2d ed. 1990).
In contrast to rule 10b-5, Utah's securities fraud provision, section 61-1-1(2), does not
operate against a background of limiting statutory authority. The interpretation we give to section
61-1-1(2) of the Utah Code is therefore not circumscribed by the dispositive language of section
10(b) of the 1934 Act. In that respect, section 61-1-1(2) of the Code atavistically resembles, not
rule 10b-5, but section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which the Aaron Court declined to
interpret as requiring scienter. 446 U.S. at 697. 16 Because of this critical difference, Hochfelder
is not particularly helpful in interpreting Utah's analogue to rule 10b-5. T 7
Further, even if we were to assume that rule 10b-5 and section 61-1-1(2) are direct parallels,
as Larsen suggests, he fails to recognize that the Utah legislature has not required the courts to
interpret the Utah Uniform Securities Act in lockstep with federal decisions. Section 61-1-27, on
which Larsen relies for his lockstep mandate, seems to make uniformity with other states more
important than uniformity with interpretations of analogous federal statutes. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-27. Section 61-1-27 provides that Utah's Uniform Securities Act "may be so construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal
legislation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis added). Although the meaning of "coordinate"
as it relates to federal legislation is not entirely clear, the mandate "to make uniform" the law of
the enacting states is unmistakable. Uniformity with a significant majority of states is achieved
only by a "no scienter" construction of the provision. See Johnson, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 369; People
v. Whitlow, 89 111. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, 60 111. Dec. 587 (111.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 830
(1982); People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich. App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989),
appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Neb.
1983); State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (KM. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Cox, 17
Wash. App. 896, 566 P.2d 935, 938 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 823 (1978);
Temby, 322 N.W.2d at 526.
As a policy argument for his position, Larsen argues that without a scienter requirement
section 61-1-1(2) raises the specter of strict liability, or in other words, a fear that accounting
firms and other professionals will be held liable for "good faith oversight" or failure "to discover
and disclose a material fact." Larsen predicts that this threat of strict liability will preclude
"responsible individuals and entities" from providing securities services in the future. This
argument completely ignores the willfulness requirement of section 61-1-21 and misuses the term
"strict liability."
An individual must act willfully to be criminally liable under the statute. This means that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused "desire[d] to engage in the
conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. This highly culpable mental state is not

consistent with "strict liability," as that term is traditionally used See Black's Law Dictionary
1422 (6th ed 1990), 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 23, 123 (15th ed 1993) Further, a "no
scienter" reading of the statute will affect only those professionals who willfully omit or misstate
material facts This result seems to be exactly what the legislature intended If the legislature had
wanted scienter for perceived public policy reasons, it could have included that requirement It did
not, and we will not 18
Larsen's second challenge is based on his claim that the trial court erred by allowing a
securities expert for the State, Sherwood Cook, 19 to testify as to the "materiality" of
information Larsen allegedly had omitted from securities-related documents Larsen's argument
before this court is somewhat diffuse Nevertheless, he appears to be asserting that the trial court
should not have admitted Cook's expert testimony on materiality under Utah Rule of Evidence
702 because the testimony purportedly expressed the "legal conclusion" that Larsen's omissions
violated section 61-1-1(2), the statute prohibiting material omissions or misstatements
We first state the proper standard of review The trial court has wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard State v Span, 819 P 2d 329, 332 n 1 (Utah 1991), Dixon v Stewart, 658
P 2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982), State v Clayton, 646 P 2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), see 2 Gregory P
Joseph & Stephen A Saltzburg, Evidence in America The Federal Rules in the States ch 51, §
51 3, at 2 & n 4 (1987) [hereinafter Joseph and Saltzburg], accord Wade v Haynes, 663 F 2d
778, 784 (8th Cir 1981), affd, 461 U S 30 (1983) Under this standard, we will not reverse
unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232, 239-40
(Utah 1992), Shurtleffv Jay Tuft & Co , 622 P 2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980)
In general, the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are governed by rules 701 through
704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 702 provides
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise
Utah R Evid 702 Under rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to the admission of
any expert evidence is whether, "on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact"
State v Rimmasch, 775 P 2d 388, 398 n 8 (Utah 1989), see Dixon, 658 P 2d at 598
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must first decide whether the subject is within the
knowledge or experience of the average individual Dixon, 658 P 2d at 597 It is not necessary
that the subject of the testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly
understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a requirement that the subject be
beyond the comprehension of each and every juror See id
Here, we agree with the court of appeals' statement that expert testimony may be appropriate
in "securities fraud cases because the technical nature of securities is not within the knowledge of

the average layman or a subject within the common experience and would help the jury
understand the issues before them." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 492-93. In his testimony, Cook was
expressing his opinion that some of the material that Larsen had omitted from the securities
documents could have been important or significant to an investor. 110 We do not find that the
trial court abused its discretion in determining that such testimony would be helpful to the jury.
Ill
Larsen claims that even if the subject of this testimony might have been beyond the
experience of the average individual, Cook's testimony regarding materiality was not "helpful"
because it transgressed into the area reserved for the jury by instructing the jury as to what legally
constitutes material information. Larsen focuses on Cook's occasional use of the term "material"
during his expert testimony. Specifically, Larsen argues that Cook could have given his testimony
without using the term "material" and that by using the term, he moved from arguably admissible
opinion evidence to an "inadmissible legal conclusion" because the statute in question is framed in
terms of material information. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2).
In the present case, the use of the term "material" presents unique problems because it has
two possible referents. First, in ordinary parlance materiality means "important" or "significant."
Oxford American Dictionary 547 (1980). Used in this context, "material" signifies something that
an individual would want to know in making an important decision. One could testify about this
concept without using the term "material" by stating that the information allegedly omitted is
important or significant. Presumably, such testimony, assuming it was otherwise helpful and
admissible, would not be objectionable as expressing a legal conclusion.
The second, and legal, usage of the term "material" comes from the Utah statute under which
Larsen was prosecuted and from securities law in general. The law uses the term "material" in
defining what information must legally be disclosed. Larsen's basic claim is that when Cook used
the disputed term, the trial court was allowing him to tell the jury that the omitted information
legally constituted material information within the meaning of the statute, and Cook was thereby
instructing the jury that Larsen was guilty. Larsen suggests, in fact, that Cook's testimony would
have been proper if he had used a word other than "material."
Cook certainly should have avoided employing the specific term "material." However, his
limited use of that word, under the circumstances, does not mandate the conclusion that he was
improperly instructing the jury on the law.
We think that Larsen's analysis, hanging as it does on one word that has two almost identical
meanings, is unduly formalistic. The jury was charged with making the ultimate determination of
whether the statements made or facts omitted by Larsen were factually material, i.e., whether they
were likely to influence a reasonable investor. Cf. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 450 (1976) ("Issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and
fact."). Given that "materiality" has a popular meaning bearing directly on the factual issue before
the jury and that Cook's testimony, when read in context, seems to use "material" as a synonym
for "important," we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Cook's
testimony.

Moreover, materiality, as it relates to the importance of the omitted information, was an
"ultimate issue." Under Utah Rule of Evidence 704, expert testimony is not objectionable solely
because it encompasses the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Rule 704 provides in
pertinent part that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R.
Evid. 704. Larsen's semantic characterization of Cook's testimony as a legal conclusion does not,
without more, move the testimony outside the scope of this ultimate-issue rule.
Larsen correctly asserts that rule 704 does not make expert testimony admissible simply
because it expresses an opinion regarding an ultimate issue. By the same token, however, rule 704
does not make expert testimony inadmissible simply because it expresses an opinion on the
ultimate issue, as Larsen seems to suggest. See Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n. 1. As one commentator
noted, "Since the adoption of rule 704, courts have generally not hesitated to follow it and to
permit expert testimony directly concerning the critical issue before the trier of fact." Joseph &
Saltzburg, ch. 53, § 53.3, at 2; see People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394, 400 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that pathologist's opinion testimony indicating attack occurred in two stages is not
improper because it embraced an ultimate issue); see also United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727,
737 (2d Cir.) (holding that trial court did not abuse it discretion by admitting expert testimony on
the reach of the concepts of "underwriter" and "materiality" in securitiesfraudcase), cert, denied,
96 S. Ct. 270, 271 (1975).
The bottom line is that the question of materiality as it relates to the importance or
significance of the omitted information is, at least on one level, a factual issue to be determined by
the jury. Rule 704 permits Cook to express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of that
disputed issue as long as that testimony is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. See
Joseph & Saltzburg, ch. 53, § 53.3, at 3. Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that the
trial court abused its discretion in permitting Cook's testimony. 112
Finally, even if the admission of Cook's testimony couched in terms of materiality had been in
error, Larsen has not convinced us that the error would have been harmful. The trial court
correctly admonished the jury as to the relative roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence
and instructed the jury to accord no unusual deference to an expert's opinions. The trial court also
gave careful instructions regarding the legal definition and requirements of the term "material" as
used in the statute. Taken together, these instructions substantially reduced whatever slight risk of
confusion Cook's use of the term "material" might have engendered in the jury. Given the trial
court's adequate instructions to the jury, wefindthat if any error had occurred in admitting the
expert testimony, it would have been harmless.
The convictions are affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice

^%

J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge
John A. Rokich, District Judge
Hall, Chief Justice, and Stewart, Justice, having disqualified themselves, do not participate
herein; Frederick and Rokich, District Judges, sat.

DISPOSITION
The convictions are affirmed.

OPINION FOOTNOTES
T1 In this case, this court is concerned only with the proper construction of a portion of
section 61-1-1, specifically subsection 1(2). We therefore do not address the question of whether
subsections 1(1) and 1(3) require scienter. Cf. Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S.
680, 695-702 (1980).
t2 In 1963, the Utah legislature substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, which had
been developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30; Uniform Securities Act, reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993 289-374
(1993). See generally Wallace R. Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap of History and
the New Uniform Act, 8 Utah L. Rev. 216, 227-28 (1963). The Uniform Act contains an
anti-fraud provision, section 101, modeled after, and with language taken from, section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933 and rule 10b-5, which was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Uniform Securities Act § 101, cmt. .01; Blue Sky
Laws, at 295. The Utah legislature incorporated section 101 into the Utah Code as section 61-1-1
without significant modification. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 with Uniform Securities Act
§101.
T 3 To act willfully in this context means to act deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished
from merely accidentally or inadvertently. Cf. United States v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 974 (10th
Cir. 1987). Willful, when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies a
willingness to commit the act, which, in this case, is the misstatement or omission of a material
fact. Willful does not require an intent to violate the law or to injure another or acquire any
advantage. See generally State v. Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983).
T4 17C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
T5U.S.C. §78j(b).
16 Section 17(a) provides:

i (

^

It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). The Supreme Court in Aaron stated "that the language of § 17(a) requires
scienter under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." 446 U.S. at 697. As we are
dealing here only with section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah provision, which is analogous to section
17(a)(2), we do not reach the question of a scienter requirement vel non under section 61-1-1(1)
or-1(3).
17 Even if Hochfelder were directly on point, the committee that promulgated the Uniform
Securities Act has indicated that the Act, in most cases including this one, was not intended to
bind state courts to related federal interpretations. See Uniform Securities Act § 501 cmt. 3
(1985), reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993 428 (1993). In 1985, the committee specifically
indicated that it "did not intend that state courts be bound to follow [Hochfelder]." Id. To the
extent that Larsen relies on a perceived mandate in the Uniform Securities Act favoring state
adherence to federal interpretations, his analysis is lacking in support.
T 8 Because a finding of scienter is not a prerequisite to criminal liability under section
61-1-1(2), the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that good faith is a complete defense
to criminal liability. Cf. In re University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1087-88 (3d Cir. 1992);
Barnett v. United States, 594 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir. 1979).
T 9 Cook was introduced to the jury as a former Utah securities regulation official and the top
securities administrator in Nevada.
110 Cook did not, as Larsen suggests, testify that Larsen was guilty, nor did Cook testify
that, as a matter of law, the facts satisfied the legal standard of materiality.
T11 Unlike Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987), the present case does not
involve expert testimony regarding legal or factual issues not before the court or jury. The Ashton
court upheld the trial court's exclusion of an attorney's proposed testimony on the legal effect of a
joint tenant's transfer of property. Id. at 153. In other words, the proposed testimony in Ashton
was intended solely to explain the applicable law, which did not aid the jury in resolving the
factual disputes.

so

112 We do not suggest that the trial court must allow expert testimony regarding materiality,
especially testimony utilizing the term "material." We simply hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing the limited testimony in this case.
We also note that an integral element of a rule 702 determination to admit expert evidence is
a balancing of the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.8 (Utah 1989). This balancing mimics that under rule 403 and is
necessary to a determination of "helpfulness." In the present case, Larsen did not specifically
object to the use of "material" on the ground that the probative value of the usage was
substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See Utah
R. Evid. 403. Larsen's objections, although citing to rule 702, addressed only the contention that
materiality in general was not a proper subject for expert testimony. Trial counsel must state
clearly and specifically all grounds for objection. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Inasmuch as Larsen
failed to assert a claim of prejudice at the trial court, that issue is not properly preserved for
appeal. If Larsen had made such an objection, it might have merited serious consideration by the
trial court.

(c) 1992-1996 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
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SUMMARY

The Los Angeles Municipal Code makes it a criminal offense for a person
convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in California to be present
in Los Angeles without registering with the police. Defendant, a resident
of Los Angeles for over seven years, was charged with a violation of this
registration provision, because within the period of her stay in Los Angeles
she had been convicted of the crime of forgery, a felony under California
law, and had not, at the time of her arrest for another offense, registered
under the Municipal Code. At the trial she offered to prove that she had
no actual knowledge of the registration requirement, but this offer was
refused. She asserted that the registration provisions of the Code denied
her due process of law. Over this objection she was found guilty and fined.
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment.
On her appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the municipal
ordinance, as applied to the defendant under the circumstances described
above, violated the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In an opinion by DOUGLAS, J., five members of the Court expressed the
view that where a person did not know of the duty to register and there
was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted
consistently with due process. Recognizing that there is wide latitude on
the part of the lawmakers to exclude elements of knowledge in declaring
an offense, the majority pointed out that this was not so where the conduct condemned was a mere failure to register.
FRANKFURTER, J., with the concurrence of HARLAN and WHITTAKER,
JJ., dissented, refusing to draw a constitutional line between "feasance"
and "nonfeasance."
BURTON, J., also dissented, because in his view the ordinance, as applied
to the defendant, did not violate her constitutional rights.

52.
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HEADNOTES
Classified to U.S. Supreme Court Digest, Annotated
Constitutional Law § 854 — due proc- Criminal Law § 20 — ignorance of law.
4. Ignorance of the law will not
ess — crimes — registration of
excuse.
criminals.
1. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated by Constitutional Law §§856, 857 —
police power — due process.
the provisions of the Los Angeles Mu5. While of all the powers of local
nicipal Code making it a criminal offense for a person convicted of an government the police power is one of
offense punishable as a felony in Cal- the least limitable, due process places
ifornia to be present in Los Angeles some limits on its exercise.
without registering with the police, as Constitutional Law §§786, 831.5 —
applied to one who had no actual
due process — notice.
knowledge of his duty to register and
6. The requirement of notice is enas to whom no showing of the prob- grained in the concept of due process;
ability of such knowledge yras made.
notice is sometimes essential so that
the citizen has a chance to defend
Appeal and Error § 1298 — presump- charges; it is required before property
tions — knowledge of registrar interests are disturbed, before assesstion law.
ments are made, before penalties are
2. On appeal from a state conviction assessed, where a penalty or forfeiture
for defendant's failure to register with might be suffered for a mere failure to
the police as a convict, the United act, and is equally required wtiere a
States Supreme Court will assume that person, wholly passive and unaware of
the defendant had no actual knowl- any wrongdoing, is charged with a
edge of the registration requirement criminal offense.
where his offer to prove his lack of
[See annotation references 1, 2]
knowledge was refused by the trial
court.
Criminal Law § 6 — wilfulness —
failure to register.
8. While a vicious will is not always
necessary to constitute a crime and
conduct alone without regard to the
intent of the doer is often sufficient,
there being a wide latitude on the part
of the lawmakers to exclude, in declaring an offense, elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition,
this is not so where the offense consists in a mere failure to register, a
conduct which is wholly passive and
unlike the commission of acts or the
failure to act under circumstances
that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed.

ANNOTATION
1. Due process requirements as to notice
in proceedings to foreclose a tax or similar
lien on real property, 1 L ed 2d 1626.
2. Due process requirements as to notice

r3

Points from Separate Opinion
Criminal Law § 6 ; Statutes §82.8 —
construction — avoiding hardships.
7. Considerations of hardship often
lead courts to attribute to a statute
the requirement of a certain mental
element—some < consciousness
of
wrongdoing and knowledge of the
law's command—as a matter of statutory construction. [From separate
opinion by Frankfurter, Harlan, and
Whittaker, JJ.] .
Constitutional Law §848; Criminal
Law §78 — cruel and unusual
punishment.
8. A cruelly disproportionate relation between what the law requires
REFERENCES
in condemnation proceedings, 1 L ed 2d
1635.
3. Excessive penalties as denial of constitutional rights, 59 L ed 608.

U. S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2Led2d
Points from Separate Opinion—Continued
and the sanction for its disobedience clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
may constitute a violation of the [From separate opinion by FrankfurEight Amendment as a cruel and un- ter, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ.]
usual punishment, and, in respect to
[See annotation reference 3]
the states, even offend the due process
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OPINION OF THE COURT
•[355 US 226]

•Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Section 52.38(a) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code defines "convicted person" as follows:
"Any person who, subsequent to
January 1, 1921, has been or hereafter is convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in the State of
California, or who has been or who
is hereafter convicted of any offense
in any place other than the State of
California, which offense, if committed in the State of California,
would have been punishable as a
felony."
Section 52.39 provides that it
shall be unlawful for "any convicted
person" to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period of more than five
days without registering; it requires
any person having a place of abode
outside the city to register if he
comes into the city on five occasions
or more during a 30-day period; and
it prescribes the information to be
furnished the Chief of Police on
registering.
Section 52.43(b) makes the failure to register a continuing offense,
each day's failure constituting a
separate offense.
Appellant, arrested on suspicion
of another offense, was charged with
a violation of this registration law.1

b^\

The evidence showed that she had
been at the time of her arro^t a resident of Los Angeles for over seven
years. Within that period she had
been convicted in Los Angeles of the
crime of forgery, an offense which
California punishes as a felony.
Though convicted of a crime punishable as a felony, she had not at the
time of her arrest registered under
the Municipal Code. At the trial,
•[855 US 227]

appellant *asserted that § 52.39 of
the Code denies her due process of
law and other rights under the Federal Constitution, unnecessary to
enumerate. The trial court denied
this objection. The case was tried to
a jury which found appellant guilty.
The court fined her $250 and placed
her on probation for three years.
Appellant, renewing her constitutional objection, moved for arrest of
judgment and a new trial. This motion was denied. On appeal the constitutionality of the Code was again
challenged. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed
the judgment, holding there was no
merit to the claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The
case is here on appeal. 28 USC
§1257(2). We noted probable ju1. For a recent comprehensive review of
these registration laws see Note, 103 U of
Pa L Rev 60 (1954).

LAMBERT v CALIFORNIA

231

855 US 225, 2 L ed 2d 228, 78 S Ct 240

risdiction, 352 US 914,1L ed 2d 121,
77 S Ct 218, and designated amicus
curiae to appear in support of appellant. The case having been
argued and reargued, we
Headnote i now hold that the registration provisions of the
Code as sought to be applied here
violate the Due Process requirement
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The registration provision, carrying criminal penalties, applies if a
person has been convicted "of an
offense punishable as a felony in
the State of California" or, in case
he has been convicted in another
State, if the offense "would have
been punishable as a felony" had it
been committed in California. No
element of willfulness is by terms
included in the ordinance nor read
into it by the California court as a
condition necessary for a conviction.
We must assume that appellant
had no actual knowledge of the requirement that she regHeadnote t ister under this ordinance, as she offered
proof of this defense which was refused. The question is whether a
registration act of this character
violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual
knowledge of his duty to register,
and where no showing is made of the
probability of such knowledge.
•[855 US 228]

*We do not go with Blackstone in
saying that "a vicious will" is necessary to constitute a
Headnote s crime, 4 Bl Comm *21,
for conduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer
is often sufficient. There is wide
latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence
from its definition. See Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v United States, 220
US 559, 578, 55 L ed 582, 589, 31 S Ct
612. But we deal here with conduct
that is wholly passive—mere failure

sr

to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act
under circumstances that should
alert the doer to the consequences of
his deed. Cf. Shevlin-Carpenter Co.
v Minnesota, 218 US 57, 54 L ed 930,
30 S Ct 663; United States v Balint,
258 US 250, 66 L ed 604, 42
5 Ct 301; United States v Dotterweich, 320 US 277, 284, 88 L ed 48,
53, 64 S Ct 134. The rule that
"ignorance of the law
Headnote 4

wfll

no

t excuse"

(Shev-

Headnote 5 lin-Carpenter Co. v Minnesota, supra, (218 US p
68)) is deep in our law, as is the
principle that of all the powers of
local government, the police power is
"one of the least limitable." District
of Columbia v Brooke, 214 US 138,
149,53Led941,945,29SCt560. On
the other hand, due process places
some limits on its exercise. Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of
Headnote 6 notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that
the citizen has the chance to defend
charges. Notice is required before
property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before
penalties are assessed. Notice is
required in a myriad of situations
where a penalty or forfeiture might
be suffered for mere failure to act.
Recent cases illustrating the point
are Mullane v Central Hanover Bank
6 Trust Co. 339 US 306, 94 L ed
865, 70 S Ct 652; Covey v Somers,
351 US 141, 100 L ed 1021, 76 S Ct
724; Walker v Hutchinson, 352 US
112, 1 L ed 2d 178, 77 S Ct 200.
These cases involved only property
interests in civil litigation. But the
principle is equally appropriate
where a person, wholly passive and
unaware of any wrongdoing, is
brought to the bar of justice for
condemnation in a criminal case.
•[355US229]

* Registration laws are common
and their range is wide. Cf. New
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York ex rel. Bryant v Zimmerman,
278 US 63,73 L ed 184,49 S Ct 61, 62
ALR 785; United States v Harriss,
347 US 612, 98 L ed 989, 74 S Ct 808;
United States v Kahriger, 345 US
22, 97 L ed 754, 73 S Ct 510. Many
such laws are akin to licensing statutes in that they pertain to the regulation of business activities. But the
present ordinance is entirely different. Violation of its provisions is
unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being
the test. Moreover, circumstances
which might move one to inquire as to
the necessity of registration are completely lacking. At most the ordinance is but a law enforcement
technique designed for the convenience of
law
enforcement
agencies through which a list of the
names and addresses of felons then
residing in a given community is
compiled. The disclosure is merely
a compilation of former convictions
already publicly recorded in the jurisdiction where obtained. Nevertheless, this appellant on first becoming
aware of her duty to register was
given no opportunity to comply with
the law and avoid its penalty, even
though her default was entirely innocent. She could but suffer the
consequences of the ordinance, name-

2 L ed 2d

ly, conviction with the imposition
of heavy criminal penalties thereunder. We believe that actual
knowledge of the duty to register
or proof of the probability of such
knowledge and subsequent failure
to comply are necessary before a
conviction under the ordinance can
stand. As Holmes wrote in The
Common Law, "A law which punished conduct which would not be
blameworthy in the average member
of the community would be too severe for that community to bear."
Id., at 50. Its severity lies in the
absence of an opportunity either to
avoid the consequences of the law or
to defend any prosecution brought
under it. Where a person did not
know of the duty to register and
where there was no proof of the
probability of such knowledge, he
may not be convicted consistently
*[355 US 230]

•with due process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it
is when the law is written in print
too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Burton dissents because he believes that, as applied to
this appellant, the ordinance does
not violate her constitutional rights.

SEPARATE OPINION

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
Whittaker join, dissenting.
The present laws of the United
States and of the 48 States are thick
with provisions that command that
some things not be done and others
be done, although persons convicted
under such provisions may have had
no awareness of what the law required or that what they did was
wrongdoing. The body of decisions
sustaining such legislation, including innumerable registration laws, is
almost as voluminous as the legisla-

S<o

tion itself. The matter is summarized in United States v Balint, 258
US 250, 252, 66 L ed 604, 605, 42 S
Ct 301: "Many instances of this are
to be found in regulatory measures
in the exercise of what is called the
police power where the emphasis
of the statute is evidently upon
achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of
the crimes as in cases of mala in se."
Surely there can hardly be a difference as a matter of fairness, of
hardship, or of justice, if one may
invoke it, between the case of a per-
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son wholly innocent of wrong doing,
in the sense that he was not remotely conscious of violating any
law, who is imprisoned for five years
for conduct relating to narcotics, and
the case of another person who is
placed on probation for three years
on condition that she pay $250, for
failure, as a local resident, convicted
under local law of a felony, to reg•[355 US 231]

ister under *a law passed as an exercise of the State's "police power,"1
Considerations of hardship often
lead courts, naturally
Headnote 7 enough, to attribute to a
statute the requirement
of a certain mental element—some
consciousness of wrong doing and
knowledge of the law's command
—as a matter of statutory construction. Then, too, a cruelly
disproportionate relation
Headnote 8 between what the law
requires and the sanction
for its disobedience may constitute
a violation of the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment, and, in respect to the States,
even offend the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But what the Court here does is
to draw a constitutional line between
a State's requirement of doing and
not doing. What is this but a return
to Year Book distinctions between
feasance and nonfeasance—a distinction that may have significance
in the evolution of common-law notions of liability, but is inadmissible
as a line between constitutionality
and unconstitutionality. One can be
confident that Mr. Justice Holmes
1. This case does not involve a person
who, convicted of a crime in another jurisdiction, must decide whether he has been
convicted of a crime that "would have been
punishable as a felony" had it been committed in California. Appellant committed

5?

would have been the last to draw
such a line. What he wrote about
"blameworthiness" is worth quoting
in its context:
"It is not intended to deny that
criminal liability, as well as civil,
is founded on blameworthiness.
Such a denial would shock the moral
sense of any civilized community;
or, to put it another way, a law
which punished conduct which would
not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community would be
too severe for that community to
*[355 US 232]

bear." (This passage *must be read
in the setting of the broader discussion of which it is an essential part.
Holmes, The Common Law, at 49,
50.)
If the generalization that underlies, and alone can justify, this decision were to be given its relevant
scope, a whole volume of the United
States Reports would be required to
document in detail the legislation in
this country that would fall or be impaired. I abstain from entering upon
a consideration of such legislation,
and adjudications upon it, because I
feel confident that the present decision will turn out to be an isolated
deviation from the strong current
of precedents—a derelict on the
waters of the law. Accordingly, I
content myself with dissenting.
NOTE
In connection with Lambert v California (1957) 355 US 225, 2 L ed 2d
228, 78 S Ct 240, an interesting article
by Professor Gerhard O. W. Mueller,
"On Common Law Mens Kea," appears
in 42 Minn L Rev 1043 (1958).
forgery in California, and was convicted
under California law. Furthermore, she
was convicted in Los Angeles itself, and
there she resided for over seven years
before the arrest leading to the present
proceedings.
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Citation/Title
UT ST S 17-16a-5, Compensation for assistance in transaction involving county—Public disclosure
and filing required
Utah Code § 17-16a-5

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 17. COUNTIES
CHAPTER 16A. COUNTY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES DISCLOSURE ACT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc, is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 17-16a-5. Compensation for assistance in transaction involving county—Public disclosure and filing required
(1) No elected or appointed officer may receive or agree to receive compensation for assisting any person or business entity in any
transaction involving the county in which he is an officer unless hefileswith the county legislative body a sworn statement giving the
information required by this section, and discloses in open meeting to the members of the body of which he is a member, immediately
prior to the discussion, the information required by Subsection (3).
(2) The statement required to befiledby this section shall befiledten days prior to the date of any agreement between the elected
or appointed officer and the person or business entity being assisted or ten days prior to the receipt of compensation by the business
entity. The statement is public information and is available for examination by the public.
(3) The statement and disclosure shall contain the following information:
(a) the name and address of the officer;
(b) the name and address of the person or business entity being or to be assisted, or in which the appointed or elected official has a
substantial interest; and
(c) a brief description of the transaction as to which service is rendered or is to be rendered and of the nature of the service
performed or to be performed.
As last amended by Chapter 227, Laws of Utah 1993.
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Citation/Title
UT ST § 17-16a-10, Violation a misdemeanor—Removal from office
Utah Code § 17-16a-10

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 17. COUNTIES
CHAPTER 16A. COUNTY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES DISCLOSURE ACT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 17-16a-10. Violation a misdemeanor—Removal from office
In addition to any penalty contained in any other provision of law, any person who knowingly and intentionally violates this part is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and shall be dismissedfromemployment or removedfromoffice.
As last amended by Chapter 241, Laws of Utah 1991.
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Citation/Title
UT ST S 76-2-103, Definitions of -intentionally, or with intent or willfully"; "knowingly, or
with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally
negligent
Utah Code § 76-2-103

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
PART 1. CULPABILITY GENERALLY
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or willfullyff; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviationfromthe standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances as viewedfromthe actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviationfromthe standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewedfromthe actor's standpoint.
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974.
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Citation/Title
UT ST § 7 6 - 2 - 3 0 4 , Ignorance or mistake of f a c t or law

Utah Code § 76-2-304
WESTS UTAH CODE
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
PART 3. DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any
prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resultedfromthe actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law
with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be
convicted of a lesser included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed.
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974.
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UT ST S 76-6-409, Theft of services
Utah Code § 76-6-409

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
PART 4. THEFT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
§ 76-6-409. Theft of services
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation by deception, threat, force,
or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them.
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he
diverts the services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them.
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, public utility and transportation services,
restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers
for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for
which a charge is made.
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television services, only if the services are obtained
by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3.
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of
deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-6-409.9.
As last amended by Chapter 215, Laws of Utah 1994
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